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We prove the unconditional security of an entanglement-based quantum-key-distribution protocol
using detectors that respond to multiple modes of light and cannot distinguish between one from
two or more photons. Even with such practical detectors, any defect in the source is automatically
detected as an increase in the error rate or in the rate of double clicks.
PACS numbers:
The idea of using quantum entanglement for absolutely
secure secret communication was first proposed by Ekert
[1], followed by a proposal of a modified quantum-key-
distribution (QKD) protocol (BBM92) by Bennett et al.
[2]. When ideal apparatuses are used and the source is
possessed by a legitimate user, the BBM92 protocol is
equivalent to the BB84 protocol [3], which does not use
an entangled source. On one hand, this property has lead
to a powerful security proof [4] based on entanglement,
which is applicable to prepare-measure protocols such as
the BB84 protocol [4] and the B92 protocol [5, 6, 7].
But on the other, the equivalence may have discouraged
the use of an entangled source in an actual setup if the
same function is available without the trouble of generat-
ing entanglement. In fact, a huge advantage of actually
using an entangled source shows up when we take de-
fects in the source into account. Defects may arise from
limitation on technology, and in the BB84 protocol they
raise new threats on the security such as the photon-
number-splitting attack [8]. Even worse, in long-distance
communication a source must be placed at an insecure
relay station and hence its property cannot be trusted
anymore. The entanglement-based protocol such as the
BBM92 protocol provides a unique property in this sit-
uation. Since the protocol is based on testing a strong
correlation unique to the entanglement, we may expect
that any defect in the source will be revealed as a degra-
dation of the correlation.
An important question at this point is what kind of
detection apparatus is required to realize such a built-
in mechanism for detecting the defects in the source. It
would surely be a disappointment if we were forced to use
an ideal detector for such a purpose. So far, it has been
shown [9] that it is sufficient if one of the two parties
have a detection apparatus with a so-called squashing
property [10], that is, equivalence to a noisy quantum
channel followed by an ideal BB84 measurement on a
qubit. It is expected that a practical detection apparatus
(as in Fig. 1) with two threshold (on/off) detectors will
satisfy the squashing property if we assign a random bit
whenever both detectors have clicked. Based on this con-
FIG. 1: Schematic of the setup for the BBM92 protocol.
jecture, practical benefits of the BBM92 protocol, such as
placing the source in the middle to achieve a larger com-
munication distance, were discussed [11] quantitatively.
But the proof of the conjecture remains open, leaving an
unsatisfactory situation that the BBM92 protocol, being
one of the basic QKD protocols with many experimental
demonstrations [12, 13, 14, 15], still requires an assump-
tion in the detectors for its security.
In this paper, we prove the unconditional security of
the BBM92 protocol with practical threshold detectors
which cannot distinguish between one photon from two
or more, and cannot single out a single optical spatio-
temporal mode either. Instead of proving the squashing
property, we adopt a protocol in which the double-click
events are simply discarded. The proof is based on a
simple inner-product formula for the basis states, which
shows that the parity of the number of incident photons
has an important role. Eve can carry out a powerful
attack by distributing odd and even numbers of photons
to the two receivers. The security is essentially obtained
by monitoring the bit-error rate and the double-click rate
to watch out for the possibility of such an attack.
The protocol considered here is the BBM92 protocol
with the detection apparatuses shown in Fig. 1. For each
event, Alice randomly chooses between the Z basis and
the X basis using a wave plate placed before the polar-
izing beam splitter (PBS). In the Z-basis measurement,
horizontal (H) and vertical (V ) polarization components
are split at the PBS and sent toward two threshold detec-
tors corresponding to bit values 0 and 1. In the X-basis
measurement, the ±45◦ polarizations (D±) are split in-
2stead. Alice publicly announces whether she detected
photons, and if so, she also announces whether both of
the detectors clicked (double clicks). Bob follows the
same protocol as Alice. The bit values are registered
only when both parties have detected photons, but nei-
ther party has seen double clicks.
As usual, we assume that non-unit efficiency and dark
counting of the detectors can be equivalently described by
a noise source in front of the detection apparatus. This
is satisfied, for example, if two detectors with matched
efficiency are used and their roles are switched randomly.
Hence, here and henceforth, we treat each detector as an
ideal threshold detector that clicks when it receives one
or more photons.
Let N be the number of events where both Alice and
Bob detected photons and their basis choices were the
same. In principle, the number of photons (nA ≥ 1)
incident on Alice’s apparatus can be determined for each
event, since this observable commutes with Alice’s actual
measurement. The same goes with Bob’s photon number
nB ≥ 1. Accordingly, the N events are classified into Nξ
‘multi-photon events’ satisfying nA+nB ≥ 3 andN(1−ξ)
‘single-photon events’ with nA = nB = 1. Among the
Nξ multi-photon events, suppose that Nξδm events were
discarded due to double clicks, and Nξǫm events showed
bit errors, namely, different bit values were registered by
Alice and Bob. The single-photon events should have no
double clicks, and suppose that they include N(1− ξ)ǫ1
bit-error events. Whereas the parameters (ξ, δm, ǫm, ǫ1)
are all measurable in principle, the actual setup does not
reveal (nA, nB) and hence only tells us the overall double-
click fraction δ and a good estimate of the overall error
fraction ǫ, which are related to (ξ, δm, ǫm, ǫ1) as
δ = ξδm, (1)
ǫ = (1− ξ)ǫ1 + ξǫm. (2)
From the N events, Alice and Bob produce sifted key of
length N(1 − δ) with a quantum bit error rate (QBER)
ǫ/(1 − δ). For simplicity, we assume that the error
correction is done by encrypted one-way communica-
tion from Alice to Bob by consuming the previously
shared secret key of length N(1− δ)fH(ǫ/(1− δ)), where
H(x) ≡ −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) and f ≥ 1 rep-
resents the inefficiency in the practical error correction
schemes. The reconciled key is further shortened by Nτ
to amplify the privacy, where τ is determined from the
observed values (δ, ǫ). The fraction Rkey of the final key
(normalized by N) is thus written as follows,
Rkey = (1 − δ) [1− fH(ǫ/(1− δ))]− τ(δ, ǫ). (3)
In the limit of large N , the final key is secure if
τ(δ, ǫ) ≥ (1− ξ)H(ǫ1) + ξ(1 − δm) (4)
holds for any attack by Eve, because the right-hand side
is given by the argument by Gottesman et al. [10] with a
pessimistic assumption that Eve perfectly knows Alice’s
bit value in multi-photon events. One might expect that
the use of multi-photons inevitably leads to bit errors
ǫm > 0 and double clicks δm > 0, but it turns out that
either value can be zero by choosing a suitable state. But
Eve cannot make both of the values to be zero at the
same time. In what follows, we determine this trade-off
relation and determine τ(δ, ǫ) satisfying Eq. (4).
Let us first suppose that Alice (or Bob) receives n pho-
tons in a single spatio-temporal mode. Let |Q,n〉 be the
state with n photons in the same polarization Q, namely,
|Q,n〉 ≡ (n!)−1/2(a†Q)
n|vac〉 with aQ being the photon
annihilation operator for polarization Q. On the Z-basis,
the outcome 0 corresponds to the projection to the state
|0
(n)
Z 〉 = |H,n〉, and 1 to the state |1
(n)
Z 〉 = |V, n〉. The
other n − 1 orthogonal states correspond to the double
clicks. On the X-basis, the outcomes 0 and 1 correspond
to the states |0
(n)
X 〉 = |D+, n〉 and |1
(n)
X 〉 = |D−, n〉. Us-
ing aD± = 2
−1/2(aH ± aV ), we obtain a relation vital to
our discussion,
〈b
(n)
X |b
′(n)
Z 〉 = (−1)
bb′n2−n/2. (5)
We can show that this relation is unaltered even if n
photons are distributed over multiple modes. In such a
case, the photon numbers n1, n2, . . . in each mode can
be measured in principle. For fixed values of {nj}, the
state |0
(n)
Z 〉 is given by |H,n1〉|H,n2〉 · · · , and so are the
other three states. Noting that
∑
j nj = n, one can see
that the inner products are still given by Eq. (5). The
only difference is the dimension d =
∏
(nj + 1) of the
state space, but it does not affect the argument below,
in which only Eq. (5) is used.
When n = 2l + 1(l = 1, 2, . . .), Eq. (5) reads
〈b
(2l+1)
X |b
′(2l+1)
Z 〉 = 〈b
(1)
X |b
′(1)
Z 〉2
−l, which leads to a clear
physical interpretation. Since the dimension d is even,
the state space HA can be identified with a combined
system HA′ ⊗HA′′ of a single photon (qubit) A
′ and an
ancilla A′′, with the relations
|b
(2l+1)
W 〉A = |b
(1)
W 〉A′ |φ
(l)
W 〉A′′ (W = Z,X), (6)
A′′〈φ
(l)
X |φ
(l)
Z 〉A′′ = 2
−l, (7)
which preserve the inner products (5). Hence for an odd
number of incident photons, Alice’s measurement can be
regarded as an ideal BB84 measurement on a qubit A′,
except that the outcome is overridden by the occurrence
of double clicks that is determined by a basis-dependent
measurement on the ancilla A′′. On the other hand, for
even numbers we have a constant inner product
〈b
(2l)
X |b
′(2l)
Z 〉 = 2
−l, (8)
which has no simple connection to a qubit.
Now let us derive a trade-off relation between (δm, ǫm).
For the moment, we consider the attacks using only a
3single combination of (nA, nB). For each event, the mea-
surement operator Ferr for having a bit error and Fcor for
sharing the same bit value are given by
Ferr = 2
−1
∑
W=X,Z
∑
b=0,1
P (|b
(nA)
W 〉A|(1 − b)
(nB)
W 〉B),(9)
Fcor = 2
−1
∑
W=X,Z
∑
b=0,1
P (|b
(nA)
W 〉A|b
(nB)
W 〉B), (10)
where P (|·〉) ≡ |·〉〈·|. 1−Fcor−Ferr corresponds to double
clicks. Let us write an expectation value of observable O
as 〈O〉ρ ≡ Tr(Oρ). If r(〈Fcor〉ρ, 〈Ferr〉ρ) ≤ 0 holds for any
state ρ, the probability of (δm, ǫm) to be deviated from
the region r(1 − δm − ǫm, ǫm) ≤ 0 is exponentially small
for large N [6, 16]. In what follows, we consider the limit
N →∞ and ignore such rare possibilities. We divide the
argument according to the parities of (nA, nB).
i) Odd–odd, nA = 2lA + 1 and nB = 2lB + 1 with
lA + lB ≥ 1. From Eqs. (6), (9) and (10) with PW ≡
P (|φ
(lA)
W 〉A′′ |φ
(lB)
W 〉B′′), we have
Fcor + Ferr = 1A′ ⊗ 1B′ ⊗ (PZ + PX)/2. (11)
Eq. (7) shows that the largest eigenvalue of PZ + PX is
1 + 2−lA−lB , and we have
δm ≥ (1 − 2
−lA−lB )/2 ≥ 1/4. (12)
ii) Odd-even, nA = 2lA + 1 ≥ 1 and nB = 2lB ≥ 2.
According to Eq. (5), there exists a unitary V satisfying
V |a
(nA)
W 〉A|b
(nB)
W 〉B = |a
(nA)
W 〉A|(b + a mod 2)
(nB)
W 〉B (13)
for W = X,Z. The operation of V is regarded as a
basis-independent controlled-NOT gate, which is possible
because the target system B is not a qubit but has a
larger dimension. Since Eve is allowed to prepare any
state, it makes no difference if we assume that she applies
V just before she sends systems A and B to Alice and
Bob. Then the relevant observables take simple forms as
follows:
V †FerrV = 1A′ ⊗ (P
1
Z + P
1
X)/2, (14)
V †FcorV = 1A′ ⊗ (P
0
Z + P
0
X)/2, (15)
where P bW ≡ P (|φ
(lA)
W 〉A′′ |b
(2lB)
W 〉B). This leads to
ǫm ≥ g(δm) for δm ≤ 1/3, (16)
where g(δ) ≡ [(1− δ)/2]−
√
δ(1 − 2δ). The boundary is
achievable with nA = 1 and nB = 2. Of course, the case
with nA = 2lA ≥ 2 and nB = 2lB + 1 ≥ 1 follows the
same condition.
Incidentally, the existence of the operation V leads to
an interesting attack by Eve with nA = 1 and nB = 2.
Suppose that Eve prepares a maximally entangled state
|φ+〉AE and a pure state |χ〉B , and then applies unitary
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FIG. 2: The observed fractions (δ, ǫ) of double clicks and of
bit errors are a mixture of the multi-photon contribution (the
shaded region) and the single photon contribution (δ = 0).
V before she distributes the photons to Alice and Bob.
As is seen from Eqs. (14) and (15), (δm, ǫm) is determined
solely by the state |χ〉B, and hence Eve can realize any
point on the boundary ǫm = g(δm) by choosing |χ〉B to
be
∑
W α|0
(2)
W 〉 + β|1
(2)
W 〉. On the other hand, Eq. (13)
shows that Alice’s outcome can be regarded as obtained
from the direct measurement on |φ+〉AE . Hence after the
basis is announced, Eve precisely learns Alice’s bit. This
particular attack constitutes a lower bound τlow on τ(δ, ǫ)
to have a secure key:
τlow(δ, ǫ) ≡ max
ξ
[
ξ − δ + (1− ξ)H
(
ǫ− ξg(δ/ξ)
1− ξ
)]
.(17)
iii) Even–even, nA = 2lA ≥ 2 and nB = 2lB ≥ 2.
Let |φ±W 〉AB ≡ 2
−1/2[|0
(nA)
W 〉A|0
(nB)
W 〉B±|1
(nA)
W 〉A|1
(nB)
W 〉B]
and define the projection Pφ±W ≡ |φ
±
W 〉〈φ
±
W |. Further
let |ψ±W 〉AB ≡ 2
−1/2[|0
(nA)
W 〉A|1
(nB)
W 〉B±|1
(nA)
W 〉A|0
(nB)
W 〉B]
and define Pψ±W accordingly. We see from Eq. (8) that the
state with the minus sign (such as |ψ−X〉AB) is orthogonal
to any of the other seven states. Hence we can write
Ferr = 2
−1[(Pψ+Z + P
ψ+
X )⊕ (P
ψ−
Z + P
ψ−
X )⊕ 0],(18)
Fcor = 2
−1[(Pφ+Z + P
φ+
X )⊕ 0⊕ (P
φ−
Z + P
φ−
X )]. (19)
This leads to the same condition as Eq. (16).
Since the general attack is a mixture of attacks to
various (nA, nB), we conclude that (δm, ǫm) must be in
the shaded region of Fig. 2, obtained by taking convex
combination of Eqs. (12) and (16). τ(δ, ǫ) is then deter-
mined as the maximum of the right-hand side of Eq. (4)
under the constraints Eqs. (1) and (2). The optimiza-
tion is reduced to a standard problem of determining the
convex hull of the points (0, ǫ1, H(ǫ1)) (0 ≤ ǫ1 ≤ 1/2),
(δm, g(δm), 1 − δm) (0 ≤ δm ≤ 1/3), and (1/4, 0, 3/4).
We classify the results into the three different regions
(a)–(c) shown in Fig. 2. Let ǫ∗1
∼= 0.080 be the root of
16ǫ∗1(1− ǫ
∗
1)
3 = 1.
(a) For ǫ ≤ ǫ∗1(1− 4δ),
τ(δ, ǫ) = 3δ + (1− 4δ)H(ǫ/(1− 4δ)). (20)
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FIG. 3: Dependence of key fraction Rkey on the double-click
fraction δ. Solid curves are proved to be secure in the dis-
carding protocol. Dash-dotted curves are the upper bounds
for the discarding protocol. Broken curves are the key frac-
tion conjectured to be secure in the random-bit-assignment
protocol.
(b) For ǫ∗1(1− 4δ) ≤ ǫ ≤ min{(1− 6δ)ǫ
∗
1+(δ/2), 1/4− δ},
τ(δ, ǫ) = [c1δ + c2ǫ + c3]/(1− 4ǫ
∗
1) (21)
with constants c1 ≡ 3− 4H(ǫ
∗
1) + 4ǫ
∗
1, c2 ≡ 4(1−H(ǫ
∗
1)),
and c3 ≡ H(ǫ
∗
1)− 4ǫ
∗
1.
(c) For (1− 6δ)ǫ∗1 + (δ/2) ≤ ǫ ≤ g(δ),
τ(δ, ǫ) = τlow(δ, ǫ). (22)
Figure 3 (solid curves) shows the key fraction Rkey in
Eq. (3) assuming the ideal error correction (f = 1). We
see that the key fraction has almost linear dependence
on the double-click fraction δ. The dash-dotted curves
are the key fractions assuming τ(δ, ǫ) = τlow(δ, ǫ), which
is the upper bound on the key fraction for any protocol
in which the privacy amplification for the single-photon
events costs H(ǫ1). The difference is not so large, indi-
cating that the pessimistic condition (4) we used for sim-
plifying argument does not sacrifice the efficiency much.
For comparison, we have added to Fig. 3 the broken
curves Rkey = 1− 2H(ǫ+ δ/2), which is the key fraction
conjectured to be secure in the protocol with random-bit
assignment for the double-click events. For lower val-
ues of ǫ, we see that discarding the double-click events is
better than assigning a random bit and raising the error
rate as a result. When ǫ is larger, both curves are al-
most the same. Hence for almost all practical purposes,
the random-bit assignment is unnecessary. On the other
hand, from the theoretical point of view, it is interesting
to notice that the conjectured curve for high ǫ slightly ex-
ceeds even the upper bound on the discarding protocol.
This may suggest that keeping Eve uninformed about the
occurrence of double clicks could have an advantage even
at the cost of raising the error rate by the random-bit
assignment. For definite answers, we must wait for the
development of the security analysis for the random-bit-
assignment protocol [17].
To conclude, we have proved the unconditional security
of an entanglement-sharing QKD protocol (the BBM92
protocol) with the use of practical detection apparatuses
and with no assumption on the source, which establishes
the prominent feature of the protocol — the built-in
mechanism for detecting defects in the source. We chose
to discard the double-click events, which enabled us to
build up the proof from a very simple nonorthogonality
relation [Eq. (5)] that holds regardless of the mode struc-
ture of incident photons. The proved secure key rate is
higher than or almost the same as the rate conjectured
for the random-bit-assignment protocol, and hence prac-
tical benefits of the BBM92 protocol discussed by Ma et
al. [11] are now confirmed with unconditional security.
The security proof is also applicable to a long-distance
QKD using quantum repeaters [19].
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